Abstract. We propose the first forward-secure signature scheme for which both signing and verifying are as efficient as for one of the most efficient ordinary signature schemes (Guillou-Quisquater [GQ88]), each requiring just two modular exponentiations with a short exponent. All previously proposed forward-secure signature schemes took significantly longer to sign and verify than ordinary signature schemes. Our scheme requires only fractional increases to the sizes of keys and signatures, and no additional public storage. Like the underlying [GQ88] scheme, our scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model.
Introduction
The Purpose of Forward Security. Ordinary digital signatures have a fundamental limitation: if the secret key of a signer is compromised, all the signatures (past and future) of that signer become worthless. This limitation undermines, in particular, the non-repudiation property that digital signatures are often intended to provide. Indeed, one of the easiest ways for Alice to repudiate her signatures is to post her secret key anonymously somewhere on the Internet and claim to be a victim of a computer break-in. In principle, various revocation techniques can be used to prevent users from accepting signatures with compromised keys. However, even with these techniques in place, the users who had accepted signatures before the keys were compromised are now left at the mercy of the signer, who could (and, if honest, would) re-issue the signatures with new keys.
Forward-secure signature schemes, first proposed by Anderson in [And97] and formalized by Bellare and Miner in [BM99] , are intended to address this limitation. Namely, the goal of a forward-secure signature scheme is to preserve the validity of past signatures even if the current secret key has been compromised. This is accomplished by dividing the total time that given public key is valid into T time periods, and using a different secret key in each time period (while the public key remains fixed). Each subsequent secret key is computed from the current secret key via a key update algorithm. The time period during which a message is signed becomes part of the signature. Forward security property means that even if the current secret key is compromised, a forger cannot forge signatures for past time periods.
Prior Schemes. Prior forward-secure signature schemes can be divided into two categories: those that use arbitrary signature schemes in a black-box manner, and those that modify specific signature scheme.
In the first category, the schemes use some method in which a master public key is used to certify (perhaps via a chain of certificates) the current public key for a particular time period. Usually, these schemes require increases in storage space by noticeable factors in order to maintain the current (public) certificates and the (secret) keys for issuing future certificates. They also require longer verification times than ordinary signatures do, because the verifier needs to verify the entire certificate chain in addition to verifying the actual signature on the message. There is, in fact, a trade-off between storage space and verification time. The two best such schemes are the tree-based scheme of Bellare and Miner [BM99] 1 (requiring storage of about log 2 T secret keys and non-secret certificates, and verification of about log 2 T ordinary signatures) and the scheme of Krawczyk [Kra00] (requiring storage of T non-secret certificates, and verification of only 2 ordinary signatures).
In the second category, there have been two schemes proposed so far (both in the random oracle model): the scheme of Bellare and Miner [BM99] based on the Fiat-Shamir scheme [FS86] , and the scheme of Abdalla and Reyzin [AR00] based the 2 t -th root scheme [OO88, OS90, Mic94] . While needing less space than the schemes in the first category, both [BM99] and [AR00] require signing and verification times that are linear in T .
Our Results. We propose a scheme in the second category, based on one of the most efficient ordinary signature schemes, due to Guillou-Quisquater [GQ88] . It uses just two modular exponentiations with short exponents for both signing and verifying.
Ours is the first forward-secure scheme where both signing and verifying are as efficient as the underlying ordinary signature scheme. Moreover, in our scheme the space requirements for keys and signatures are nearly the same as those in the underlying signature scheme (for realistic parameter values, less than 50% more).
The price of such efficient signing and verifying and storage is in the running times of our key generation and update routines: both are linear in T (however, so is the key generation and non-secret storage in the scheme of [Kra00] ; as well as the key generation, signing and verifying in the Fiat-Shamir-based scheme of [BM99] and the scheme of [AR00] ). However, key generation and update are key stays fixed but no such certificates of per-period public keys are present (and, indeed, such schemes are proposed in [BM99, AR00] , as well as in this paper).
The notion of a key-evolving signature scheme captures, in full generality, the idea of a scheme with a fixed public key and a varying secret key. It is, essentially, a regular signature scheme with the additions of time periods and the key update algorithm. Note that this notion is purely functional: security is addressed separately, in the definition of forward security (which is the appropriate security notion for key-evolving signature schemes).
Thus, a key-evolving digital signature scheme is a quadruple of algorithms, FSIG = (FSIG.key, FSIG.sign, FSIG.ver, FSIG.update), where:
-FSIG.key, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter k ∈ N (given in unary as 1 k ) and the total number of periods T and returns a pair (SK 1 , PK ), the initial secret key and the public key; -FSIG.sign, the (possibly probabilistic) signing algorithm, takes as input the secret key SK j = S j , j, T for the time period j ≤ T and the message M to be signed and returns the signature j, sign of M for time period j; -FSIG.ver, the (deterministic) verification algorithm, takes as input the public key PK , a message M , and a candidate signature j, sign , and returns 1 if j, sign is a valid signature of M or 0, otherwise. It is required that FSIG.ver(PK , M, FSIG.sign(SK j , M )) = 1 for every message M and time period j. -FSIG.update, the (possibly probabilistic) secret key update algorithm, takes as input the secret key SK j for the current period j < T and returns the new secret key SK j+1 for the next period j + 1.
We adopt the convention that SK T +1 is the empty string and FSIG.update(SK T ) returns SK T +1 . When we work in the random oracle model, all the above-mentioned algorithms would have an additional security parameter, 1 l , and oracle access to a public hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l , which is assumed to be random in the security analysis.
Forward Security. Forward security captures the notion that it should be computationally infeasible for any adversary to forge a signature for any past time period even in the event of exposure of the current secret key. Of course, since the update algorithm is public, nothing can be done with respect to future secret keys, except for revoking the public key (thus invalidating all signatures for the time period of the break-in and thereafter). To define forward security formally, the notion of a secure digital signature of [GMR88] is extended in [BM99] to take into account the ability of the adversary to obtain a key by means of a break-in.
Intuitively, in this new model, the forger first conducts an adaptive chosen message attack (cma), requesting signatures on messages of its choice for as many time periods as he desires. Whenever he chooses, he "breaks in": requests the secret key SK b for the current time period b and then outputs an (alleged) signature on a message M of his choice for a time period j < b. The forger is considered to be successful if the signature is valid and the pair (M, j) was not queried during cma.
Formally, let the forger F = F.cma, F.forge . For a key pair (PK , SK 0 ) R ← FSIG.key(k, . . . , T ), F.cma, given P K and T , outputs (CM, b), where b is the break-in time period and CM is a set of adaptively chosen message-period pairs (the set of signatures sign(CM ) of the current set CM is available to F at all times, including during the construction of CM ) 3 . Finally, F.forge outputs M, j, sig ← F.forge(CM, sign(CM ), SK b ). We say that F is successful if M, j ∈ CM, j < b, and FSIG.ver PK (M, j, sig ) = 1. (Note: formally, the components of F can communicate all the necessary information, including T and b, via CM .)
Define Succ fwsig (FSIG[k, T ], F ) to be the probability (over coin tosses of F and FSIG) that F is successful. Let the function InSec fwsig (FSIG[k, T ], t, q sig ) (the insecurity function) be the maximum, over all algorithms F that are restricted to running time t and q sig signature queries, of Succ fwsig (FSIG[k, T ], F ). The insecurity function above follows the "concrete security" paradigm and gives us a measure of how secure or insecure the scheme really is. Therefore, we want its value to be as small as possible. Our goal in a security proof will be to find an upper bound for it.
The above definition can be translated to the random oracle model in a standard way [BR93] : by introducing an additional security parameter 1 l , allowing all algorithms the access to the random oracle H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l , and considering q hash , the number of queries to the random oracle, as one more parameter for the forger.
Assumption
We use a variant of the strong RSA assumption (to the best of our knowledge, first introduced independently in [BP97] and [FO97] ), which postulates that it is to compute any root of a fixed value modulo a composite integer. More precisely, the strong RSA assumption states that it is intractable, given n that is a product of two primes and a value α in Z * n , to find β ∈ Z * n and r > 1 such that β r = α. However, we modify the assumption in two ways. First, we restrict ourselves to the moduli that are products of so-called "safe" primes (a safe prime is one of the form 2q + 1, where q itself is a prime). Note that, assuming safe primes are frequent, this restriction does not strengthen the assumption. Second, we upperbound the permissible values or r by 2 l+1 , where l is a security parameter for our scheme (in an implementation, l will be significantly shorter than the length k of the modulus n).
More formally, let A be an algorithm. Consider the following experiment.
Experiment Break-Strong-RSA(k, l, A) Randomly choose two primes q 1 and q 2 of length k/2 − 1 each such that 2q 1 + 1 and 2q 2 + 1 are both prime.
be the maximum of Succ(A, k, l) over all the adversaries A who run in time at most t. Our assumption is that InSec SRSA (k, l, t), for t polynomial in k, is negligible in k. The smaller the value of l, of course, the weaker the assumption.
In fact, for a sufficiently small l, our assumption follows from a variant of the fixed-exponent RSA assumption. Namely, assume that there exists a constant such that, for every r, the probability of computing, in time t, an r-th root of a random integer modulo a k-bit product of two safe primes, is at most 2
Mathematical Tools
The following two simple statements will be helpful later. They were first pointed out by Shamir [Sha83] in the context of generation of pseudorandom sequences based on the RSA function.
Proposition 1. Let G be a group. Suppose e 1 , e 2 ∈ Z are such that gcd(e 1 , e 2 ) = 1. Given a, b ∈ G such that and a e1 = b e2 , one can compute c such that c e2 = a in O(log(e 1 + e 2 )) group and arithmetic operations.
Proof. Using Euclid's extended gcd algorithm, within O(log(e 1 + e 2 )) arithmetic operations compute f 1 , f 2 , such that e 1 f 1 + e 2 f 2 = 1.
Lemma 1. Let G be a finite group. Suppose e 1 ∈ Z and e 2 ∈ Z are such that gcd(e 1 , e 2 ) = g and gcd(g, |G|) = 1. Given a, b ∈ G, such that a e1 = b e2 , one can compute c such that c e2/g = a in O(log e1+e2 g ) group and arithmetic operations.
Proof. Since gcd(g, |G|) = 1, (z g = 1) ⇒ (z = 1) for any z ∈ G. Let e 1 = e 1 /g, e 2 = e 2 /g. Then (a e 1 /b e 2 ) g = 1, so a e 1 = b e 2 , so we can apply and Proposition 1 to get c such that c e 2 = a.
The Guillou-Quisquater Signature Scheme
In [GQ88] , Guillou and Quisquater propose the following three-round identification scheme, summarized in Figure 1 . Let k and l be two security parameters. The prover's secret key consists of a k-bit modulus n (a product of two random primes p 1 , p 2 ), an (l + 1)-bit exponent e that is relatively prime to φ(n) = (p 1 − 1)(p 2 − 1), and a random s ∈ Z * n . The public key consists of n, e and v where v ≡ 1/s e (mod n). In the first round, the prover generates a random r ∈ Z * n , computes the commitment y = r e (mod n) and sends y to the the verifier. In the second round, the verifier sends a random l-bit challenge σ to the prover. In the third round, the prover computes and sends to the verifier z = rs σ . To check, the verifier computes y = z e v σ and checks if y = y (and y ≡ 0 (mod n)). The scheme's security is based on the assumption that computing roots modulo composite n is infeasible without knowledge of its factors (the precise assumption varies depending on how e is chosen), and can be proven using Lemma 1. Informally, if the prover can answer two different challenges, σ and τ , for the same y, then it can provide z σ and z τ such that z
Note that e is l + 1-bits long, hence e > |σ − τ |, hence g = gcd(σ − τ, e) < e, so r = e/g > 1. By Lemma 1, knowing v, σ − τ, z σ /z τ and e allows one to efficiently compute the r-th root of v (to apply the lemma, we need to have g relatively prime with the order φ(n) of the multiplicative group Z * n , which is the case by construction, because e is picked to be relatively prime with φ(n)). Thus, the prover must know at least some root of v (in fact, if e is picked to be prime, then the prover must know precisely the e-th root of v, because g = 1 and r = e). Note that it is crucial to the proof that e > 2 l and e is relatively prime with φ(n).
The standard transformation of [FS86] can be applied to this identification scheme to come up with the GQ signature scheme, presented in Figure 1 . Essentially, the interactive verifier's l-bit challenge σ is now computed using a random oracle (hash function) H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} L applied to the message M and the commitment y.
3 Our Forward-Secure Scheme
Main ideas for forward security
The main idea for our forward-secure scheme is to combine the GQ scheme with Shamir's observation (Lemma 1). Namely, let e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e T be distinct integers, all greater than 2 l , all pairwise relatively prime and relatively prime with φ(n).
In time period i, the signer will simply use the GQ scheme with the secret key (n, s i , e i ) and the verifier will use the GQ scheme with the public key (n, v, e i ). Intuitively, this will be forward-secure because of the relative primality of the e i 's: if the forger breaks-in during time period b and learns the e b -th, e b+1 -th, . . . , e T -th roots of v, this will not help it compute e j -th root of v for j < b (nor, more generally, the r-th root of v, where r|e j ). This idea is quite simple. However, we still need to address the following two issues: (i) how the signer computes the s i 's, and (ii) how both the signer and the verifier obtain the e i 's.
Computing s i 's. Notice that if the signer were required to store all the s i 's, this scheme would require secret storage that is linear in T . However, this problem can be easily resolved. Let f i = e i · e i+1 · . . . · e T . Let t i be such that t fi i ≡ 1/v (mod n). During the j-th time period, the signer stores s j and t j+1 . At update time, the signer computes s j+1 = t fj+2 j+1 mod n and t j+2 = t ej+1 j+1 mod n. This allows secret storage that is independent of T : only two values modulo n are stored at any time (the f i and e i values are not stored-see below). It does, however, require computation linear in T at each update, because of the high cost of computing s j+1 from t j+1 .
We can reduce the computation at each update to be only logarithmic in T by properly utilizing precomputed powers of t j+1 . This will require us, however, to store 1 + log 2 T secrets instead of just two. This optimization concerns only the efficiency of the update algorithm and affects neither the other components of the scheme nor the proof of security, and is therefore presented separately in Section 4.2.
Obtaining e i 's. In order for the scheme to be secure, the e i 's need to be relatively prime with each other 4 and with φ(n), and greater than 2 l . The signer can therefore generate the e i 's simply as distinct (l + 1)-bit primes. Of course, to store all the e i 's would require linear in T (albeit public) storage. However, the signer need only store e j for the current time period j, and generate anew the other e i 's for i > j during key update. This works as long as the signer uses a deterministic algorithm for generating primes: either pseudorandom search or sequential search from fixed starting points. The fact that e i 's are not stored but rather recomputed each time slows down the update algorithm only (and, as we show in Section 3.3, not by much). Note that the way we currently described the update algorithm, for the update at time period j the signer will need to compute e j+1 , . . . , e T . With the optimization of Section 4.2, however, only at most log 2 T of the e i 's will need to be computed at each update.
We have not yet addressed the issue of how the verifier gets the e i 's. Of course, it could simply generate them the same way that the signer does during each key update. However, this will slow down verification, which is undesirable. The solution is perhaps surprising: the verifier need not know the "true" e i 's at all! The value of e j can be simply included by the signer in every signature for time period j. Of course, a forger is under no obligation to include the true e j . Therefore, to avoid ambiguity, we will denote by e the value included in a signature. It may or may not actually equal e j .
For the security of the scheme, we require that e satisfy the following requirements:
1. e should be included as an argument to the hash function H, so that the forger cannot decide on e after seeing the challenge σ; 2. e should be greater than 2 l , for the same reasons as in the GQ scheme; 3. e should be relatively prime with φ(n), for the same reasons as in the GQ scheme; and 4. e should be relatively prime with the e b , . . . , e T (where b is the break-in time period), so that the knowledge of the root of v of degree e b · e b+1 · . . . · e T does not help the forger compute any root of v of degree r|e.
The first two conditions can be easily enforced by the verifier. The third condition can be enforced by having n be a product of two "safe" primes (primes p 1 , p 2 that are of the form p i = 2q i + 1, where q is prime). Then the verifier simply needs to check that e is odd (then it must be relatively prime with φ(n)-otherwise, it would be divisible by q 1 , q 2 or q 1 q 2 , which would imply that the forger could factor n).
It is the fourth condition that presents difficulties. How can the verifier check the that e is relatively prime with e b , . . . , e T without knowing b and the actual values of e b , . . . , e T ? We accomplish this by splitting the entire interval between 2 l and 2 l+1 into T consecutive buckets of size 2 l /T each, and having each e i be a prime from the i-th bucket. Then the verifier knows that the actual values e j+1 , . . . , e T are all at least 2 l (1 + j/T ) and prime. Thus, as long as e in the signature for time period j is less than 2 l (1+j/T ), it is guaranteed to be relatively prime with e j+1 , . . . , e T , and hence with e b , . . . , e T (because b > j).
Thus, to enforce the above four conditions, the verifier needs to check is that e is odd, is between 2 l and 2 l (1 + j/T ) and is included in the hash computation.
The scheme
Our scheme (denoted IR) based on the above ideas is presented in Figure 2 . As in the GQ scheme, let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l be a hash function.
Efficiency
Signing and Verifying. The distinghuishing feature of our scheme is the efficiency of the signing and verification algorithms. Both are the same as the already efficient ordinary GQ scheme (verifying has the additional, negligible component of testing whether e is in the right range and odd). Namely, they each take two modular exponentiations, one modular multiplication and an application of H, for a total time of O(k 2 l) plus the time required to evaluate H. (Note that, just like the GQ scheme, one of the two modular exponentiations for signing can be done off-line, before the message is known; also, one of the two modular exponentiations for verifying is of a fixed base v, and can benefit from precomputation.)
Key Generation. We need to make strong assumptions on the distributions of primes in order to estimate efficiency of key generation. First, we assume that at least one in O(k) k/2 -bit numbers is a prime, and that at least one in O(k) of those is of the form 2q + 1, where q is prime. Then, generating n takes O(k 2 ) primality tests. Each primality test can be done in O(k 3 ) bit operations [BS96] . Thus, the modulus n is generated in O(k 5 ) bit operations (a factor k slower than an RSA modulus, because of the need for safe primes). Similarly, we will assume that at least one in O(l) integers in each bucket [2 l (1 + (i − 1)/T ), 2 l (1 + i/T )) is a prime, so generating each e i takes O(l 4 ) bit operations. In addition to generating n and the e i 's, key generation needs to compute the product of the e i 's modulo φ(n), which takes O(T kl) bit operations, and three modular exponentiations, each taking O(k 2 l) bit operations. Therefore, key generation takes O(k 5 + l 4 T + k 2 l + klT )) bit operations. Note that, similarly to the GQ scheme, n and e i 's may be shared among users if n is generated by a trusted party, because each user need not know the factors of n. Each user can simply generate its own t 1 and v.
Key Update. Key update cannot multiply all the relevant e i 's modulo φ(n), because φ(n) is not available (otherwise, the scheme would not be forward-secure). Therefore, it has to perform O(T ) modular exponentiations separately, in addition to regenerating all the e i 's. Thus, it takes O(k 2 lT + l 4 T ) bit operations. Note that the l 4 T component is present in the running time for the update algorithm because of the need to regenerate the e i 's each time. However, for practical values of l (on the order of 100) and k (on the order of 1000), l 4 T is roughly the same as k 2 lT , so this only slows down the key update algorithm by algorithm IR.key(k, l, T ) Generate random ( k/2 − 1)-bit primes q1, q2 s.t. pi = 2qi + 1 are both prime n ← p1p2 t1
j+1 mod n return SK j+1 = (j + 1, T, n, sj+1, tj+2, ej+1, seed ) a small constant factor. Moreover, in Section 4.1 we show how to reduce the l 4 T component in both key generation and update to (l 2 + log 4 T )T (at a very slight expense to signing and verifying).
Finally, as shown in Section 4.2, if we are willing to increase secret storage from 2k bits (for s j and t j+1 ) to (1+log 2 T )k bits, then we can replace the factor of T in the cost of update by the factor of log 2 T , to get update at the cost of O((l 4 + k 2 l) log T ) (or, if optimization of Section 4.1 is additionally applied, O((k 2 l + l 2 + log 4 T ) log T )).
Sizes. All the key and signature sizes are comparable to those in the ordinary GQ scheme. The public key has l+1 fewer bits than the GQ public key, and the signatures have l + 1 more bits, because e is included in the signature rather than in the public key. In addition, both the public key and the signature have log 2 T more bits in order to accommodate T in the public key and the current time period in the signature (this is necessary in any forward-secure scheme). Thus, the total public key length is 2k + log 2 T bits, and signature length is k + 2l + 1 + log 2 T bits. Optimization of Section 4.1 shortens the signatures slightly, replacing l + 1 of the signature bits with about log 2 T bits.
The secret key is k + 2 log 2 T + |seed | bits longer than in the GQ scheme in order to accommodate the current time period j, the total time periods T , the value t j+1 necessary to compute future keys and the seed necessary to regenerate the e i 's for i > j. Thus, the total secret key length is 3k + l + 1 + |seed | + 2 log 2 T bits (note that only 2k of these bits need to be kept secret). If the optimization of Section 4.2 is used, then the secret contains an additional k(log 2 T − 1) bits, all of which need to be kept secret.
Security
The exact security of our scheme (in the random oracle model) is close to the exact security of the schemes of [BM99,AR00]. The proof is also similar: it closely follows the one in [AR00], combining ideas from [PS96,BM99,MR99].
First, we state the following theorem that will allow us to upper-bound the insecurity function. The full proof of the theorem is very similar to the one in [AR00] and is contained in Appendix A. Theorem 1. Given a forger F for IR[k, l, T ] that runs in time at most t, asking q hash hash queries and q sig signing queries, such that Succ fwsig (IR[k, l, T ], F ) ≥ ε, we can construct an algorithm A that, on input n (a product of two safe primes), α ∈ Z * n and l, runs in time t and outputs (β, r) such that 1 < r ≤ 2 l+1 and β r ≡ α (mod n) with probability ε , where
Proof Outline. A will use F as a subroutine. (Note that A gets to provide the public key for F and to answer its signing and hashing queries.) A bases the public key v on α as follows: it randomly guesses j between 1 and T , hoping that F 's eventual forgery will be for the j-th time period. It then generates e 1 , . . . , e T just like the real signer, sets t j+1 = α and computes v as v = 1/t fj+1 j+1 mod n, where, as above, f j+1 = e j+1 · . . . · e T .
Then A runs F . Answering F 's hash and signature queries is easy, because A fully controls the random oracle H. If A's guess for j was correct, and F indeed will output a forgery for the j-th time period, then F 's break-in query will be for the secret of a time period b > j. A can compute the answer as follows:
..·eT (the other components of SK b are not secret, anyway). Suppose A's guess was correct, and in the end F outputs a signature (z, σ, j, e) on some message M . We will assume that F asked a hash query on (j, e, y, M ) where y = z e v σ mod n (F can always be modified to do so.)
Then, A runs F the second time with the same random tape, giving the same answers to all the oracle queries before the query (j, e, y, M ). For (j, e, y, M ), A gives a new answer τ . If F again forges a signature (z , τ, j, e) using the same hash query, we will have that
(mod n). Note that because e is guaranteed to be relatively prime with f j+1 , and σ − τ has at least one fewer bit than e, gcd(f j+1 (σ − τ ), e) = gcd(σ − τ, e) < e (as long as σ = τ ). Thus, r = e/ gcd(f j+1 (τ − σ), e) > 1 and, by Lemma 1, A will be able to efficiently compute the r-th root of α.
Please refer to Appendix A for further details.
This allows us to state the following theorem about the insecurity function of our scheme.
Theorem 2. For any t, q sig , and q hash ,
Proof. To compute the insecurity function, simply solve for (ε − 2 2−k q sig (q hash + 1))/T the quadratic equation in Theorem 1 that expresses ε in terms of ε to get
and then solve the resulting inequality for ε.
Further Improving Efficiency

Finding the e i 's faster
Finding e i 's takes time because they need to be l + 1-bit primes. If we were able to use small primes instead, we could search significantly faster, both because small primes are more frequent and because primality tests are faster for shorter lengths.
5
We cannot use small primes directly because, as already pointed out, the e i 's must have at least l + 1 bits. However, we can use powers of small primes that are at least l + 1 bits. That is, we let i be a small prime, π( i ) be such that
l and e i = π( i ) i
. As long as π is a deterministic function of its input (for example, π( ) = l/ log 2 ), we can replace e in the signature by , and have the verification algorithm compute e = π( ) . Of course, the verification algorithm still needs to ensure that e is relatively prime to φ(n) and to e b , . . . , e T . This is accomplished essentially the same way as before: we divide a space of small integers into T consecutive buckets of some size S each, and have each i come from the i-th bucket: i ∈ [(i − 1)S, iS). Then, when verifying a signature for time period j, it will suffice to check that is odd and comes from a bucket no greater than the j-th: < jS. It will be then relatively prime to b , . . . , T , and therefore e = π( ) will be relatively prime to e b , . . . , T .
When we used large primes, we simply partitioned the space of (l + 1)-bit integers into large buckets, of size 2 l /T each. We could have used smaller buckets, but this offered no advantages. However, now that we are using small primes, it is advantageous to make the bucket size S as small as possible, so that even the largest prime (about T S) is still small. Thus, to see how much this optimization speeds up the search for the e i 's, we need to upper-bound S. S needs to be picked so that there is at least one prime in each interval [(i − 1)S, iS) for 1 ≤ i ≤ T . It is reasonable to conjecture that the distance between two consecutive primes P n and P n+1 is at most (ln 2 P n ) [BS96] . Therefore, because the largest prime we are looking for is smaller than T S, S should be such that S > ln 2 T S. It is easy to see that S = 4 ln 2 T will work for T ≥ 75. (As a practical matter, computation shows that, for any reasonable value of T , the value of S will be quite small: S = 34 will work for T = 1000, because the largest gap between the first 1000 primes is 34; by the same reasoning, S = 72 will work for T = 10 4 , S = 114 will work for T = 10 5 , and S = 154 will work for T = 10 6 .) Thus, the i 's are all less than 4T ln 2 T , and therefore the size of each i is O(log T ) bits. Thus, finding and testing the primality of the i 's and then computing the e i 's takes O(T (log 4 T + l 2 )) time, as opposed to O(T l 4 ) without this optimization. The resulting scheme will slightly increase verification time: the verifier needs to compute e from . This takes time O(l 2 ) (exponentiating any quantity to obtain an (l +1)-bit quantity takes time O(l 2 )), which is lower order than O(k 2 l) verification time. Moreover, it will be impossible to get e i to be exactly l + 1 bits (it will be, on average, about l + (log 2 T )/2 bits). This will slow down both verification and signing, albeit by small amounts. Therefore, whether to use the optimization in practice depends on the relative importance of the speeds of signing and verifying vs. the speeds of key generation and update.
Optimizing key update
The
1/ei mod φ(n) mod n. However, the signer cannot store φ(n)-otherwise the forger would obtain it during a break-in, and thus be able to factor n and produce the past periods' secrets (and signatures). The value of φ(n) can be used only during the initial key generations stage, after which it should be securely deleted.
To enable generation of current and future s i 's without compromising the past ones, we had defined (in Section 3) a secret t i for time period i, from which it was possible to derive all future periods' secrets s j≥i . The update of t i to t i+1 can be implemented efficiently (1 exponentiation). However, in this approach the computation of each s i from t i requires Θ(T − i) exponentiations. This computation can be reduced dramatically if the storage is increased slightly.
Specifically, in this section we demonstrate how replacing the single secret t i with log 2 T secrets can reduce the complexity of the update algorithm to only log 2 T exponentiations.
Abstracting the Problem. Consider all subsets of Z T = {1, 2, . . . , T }. Let each such subset S correspond to the secret value t S = t i / ∈S ei 1 . For example, t 1 corresponds to Z T , t i corresponds to {i, i + 1, . . . , T }, v −1 corresponds to the empty set, and each s i corresponds to the singleton set {i}. Raising some secret value t S to power e i corresponds to dropping i from S.
Thus, instead of secrets and the exponentiation operation, we can consider sets and the operation of removing an element. Our problem, then, can be reformulated as follows: design an algorithm that, given Z T , outputs (one-by-one, in order) the singleton sets {i} for 1 ≤ i ≤ T . The only way to create new sets is to remove elements from known sets. The algorithm should minimize the number of element-removal operations (because they correspond to the expensive exponentiation operations).
Fairly elementary analysis quickly demonstrates that the most efficient solution for this problem (at least for T that is a power of 2) is the following divide-and-conquer algorithm:
Input:
An ordered non-empty set A. Output: Singleton sets {x}, for x ∈ A, in order.
Steps:
If A has one element, output A and return.
Remove the second half of A's elements to get B.
Recurse on B.
Remove the first half of A's elements to get C.
Recurse on C.
This algorithm takes exactly T log 2 T element-removal operations to output all the singletons. Moreover, the recursion depth is 1 + log 2 T , so only 1 + log 2 T sets need to be stored at any time (each set is just a consecutive interval, so the bookkeeping about what each set actually contains is simple).
This recursive algorithm can essentially be the update algorithm for our scheme: at every call to update, we run the recursive algorithm a little further, until it produces the next output. We then stop the recursive algorithm, save its stack (we need to save only log 2 T secrets, because the remaining one is the output of the algorithm), and run it again at the next call to update. A little more care needs to be taken to ensure forward security: none of the sets stored at time period i should contain elements less than i. This can be done by simply removing i from all sets that still contain in (and that are still needed) during the i-th update. The total amount of work still does not change.
Because there are T calls to update (if we include the initial key generation), the amortized amount of work per update is exactly log 2 T exponentiations. However, some updates will be more expensive than others, and update will still cost Θ(T ) exponentiations in the worst case. We thus want to improve the worstcase running time of our solution without increasing the (already optimal) total running time. This can be done through pebbling techniques, described below.
Pebbling. Let each subset of Z T correspond to a node in a graph. Connect two sets by a directed edge if the destination can be obtained from the source by dropping a single element. The resulting graph is the T -dimensional hypercube, with directions on the edges (going from higher-weight nodes to lower-weight nodes). We can traverse the graph in the direction given by the edges. We start at the node corresponding to Z T , and need to get to all the nodes corresponding to the singleton sets {i}.
One way to accomplish this task is given by the above recursive algorithm, which has the minimal total number of steps. However, we would like to minimize not only the total number of steps, but also the number of steps taken between any two "consecutive" nodes {i} and {i + 1}, while keeping the memory usage low. We will do this by properly arranging different branches of the recursive algorithm to run in parallel.
To help visualize the algorithm, we will represent each set stored as a pebble at the corresponding node in a graph. Then removing an element from a set corresponds to moving the corresponding pebble down the corresponding directed edge. The original set may be preserved, in which case a "clone" of a pebble is left at the original node, or it may be discarded, in which case no such clone is left. Our goal can be reformulated as follows in terms of pebbles: find a pebbling strategy that, starting at the node Z T , reaches every node {i} in order, while minimizing the number of pebbles used at any given time (this corresponds to total secret storage needed), the total number of pebble moves (this corresponds to total number of exponentiations needed), and the number of pebble moves between any two consecutive hits of a singleton (this corresponds to the worst-case cost of the update algorithm).
The Pebbling Algorithm. We shall assume that T > 1 is a power of 2. The following strategy uses at most 1 + log 2 T pebbles, takes T log 2 T total moves (which is the minimum possible), and requires at most log 2 T moves per update.
Each pebble has the following information associated with it:
1. its current position, represented by a set P ⊆ Z T (P will always be a set of consecutive integers {P min , . . . , P max }); 2. its "responsibility," represented by a set R ⊆ P (R will also always be a set of consecutive integers {R min , . . . , R max }; moreover |R| will always be a power of 2).
Each pebble's goal is to ensure that it (together with its clones, their clones, etc.) reaches every singleton in its set P . If R P , then the pebble can move towards this goal by removing an element from P . If, however, R = P , then the pebble has to clone (unless |P | = |R| = 1, in which case it has reached its singleton, and can be removed from the graph). Namely, it creates a new pebble with the same P , and responsibility set R containing only the second half of R. It then changes its own R to R − R (thus dividing its responsibility evenly between itself and its clone). Now both the pebble and the clone can move towards their disjoint sets of singletons.
We start with a single pebble with P = R = Z T . The above rules for moving and cloning ensure that the combined moves of all the pebbles will be the same as in the recursive algorithm. Thus, the steps of the pebbles are already determined. We now have to specify the timing rules: namely, when the pebbles take their steps. A careful specification is important: if a pebble moves too fast, then it can produce more clones than necessary, thus increasing the total memory; if a pebble moves too slowly, then it may take longer to reach its destination singletons, thus increasing the worst-case cost of update.
In order to specify the timing rules, we will imagine having a clock. The clock "ticks" consecutive integer values, starting with −T /2 + 1. After each clock tick, each pebble will decide whether to move and, if so, for how many moves, as follows:
1. The original pebble always makes two moves per clock tick, until it reaches the singleton {1}. After reaching the singleton it stops, and then removes itself from the graph on the next clock tick. 2. After a new pebble is cloned with responsibility set R, it stays still for |R|/2 clock ticks. After |R|/2 -th clock-tick following its birth, it starts moving at one move per clock tick. After |R| such moves, it starts moving a two moves per clock tick, until it reaches its leftmost singleton. After reaching the singleton it stops, and then removes itself from the graph on the next clock tick.
We remark that the above rules may seem a bit complex. Indeed, simpler rules can be envisioned: for example, allowing each pebble at most one move per clock tick, and specifying that each pebbles moves following a given clock tick only if it absolutely has to move in order to reach its leftmost singleton on time. However, this set of rules will require (log 2 T ) − 2 pebbles (even though at most log 2 T of them will be moving at any given time). Having pebbles move at variable speeds allows us to delay their cloning, and thus reduces the total number of pebbles, as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Suppose T > 1 is a power of two. If i is the value most recently ticked by the clock, then the total number of pebbles under the above rules never exceeds 1 + log 2 (T − i) (if i ≥ 0) or (log 2 T ) − log 2 −i (if −T < i < 0). The number of moves occurring immediately following the clock tick i also never exceeds this quantity. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T , a pebble reaches the singleton i + 1 immediately before the clock ticks the value i + 1, and is removed before the clock ticks i + 2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on log 2 T .
For T = 2, we start with a single pebble with P = R = {1, 2}. After the clock ticks 0, this pebble clones the pebble with R = 2, and itself moves to P = {1}. The clone waits for one clock tick and then, after the clock ticks 1, the clone moves to P = {2}.
Suppose the statement is true for some T that is a power of two. We will now prove it for T = 2T . After clock tick −T + 1, we have two pebbles: one responsible for {1, . . . , T }, and the other responsible for {T + 1, . . . , 2T }. For the next T /2 − 1 clock ticks, the first pebble will move at two steps per tick, and the second one will stay put (thus, the number of moves does not exceed the number of pebbles). After the clock ticks −T /2, the first pebble will arrive at position P = {1, . . . , T }. Thus, starting at t = −T + 1, the inductive hypothesis applies to the all the pebbles that will cover the first half of the singletons: there is a single pebble until t = −T /2 + 1 and it is in position P = {1, . . . , T } after clock tick −T /2 + 1.
The second pebble will reach the position P = {2, . . . , T } after the clock ticks T /2. Thus, again, after the clock ticks 1, the inductive hypothesis applies to all the pebbles that will cover the second half of the singletons, except that time is shifted forward by T . That is, if 1 ≤ i < T , then the number of pebbles in the second half does not exceed (log 2 T ) − log 2 (T − i) , and if t ≥ T , then the number of pebbles in the second half does not exceed 1 + log 2 (2T − i) .
The key to finishing the proof is to realize that the first half will lose a pebble just as the second half gains one. To be precise, we can consider the following four cases.
-For −T < i < 0, we have (log 2 T ) − log 2 −i pebbles in the first half (by the inductive hypothesis), and one pebble in the second half, so we have a total of (log 2 2T ) − log 2 −i pebbles, as required. -For i = 0, we have 1 + log 2 T = log 2 2T pebbles in the first half (by the inductive hypothesis), and one pebble in the second half, for a total of 1 + log 2 2T pebbles, as required.
-For 0 < i ≤ T , we have 1 + log 2 (T − i) pebbles in the first half and (log 2 T ) − log 2 (T − i) pebbles in the second half (both by the inductive hypothesis), for a total of 1+log 2 T = 1+ log 2 (2T − i) pebbles, as required. -For i > T , we have no pebbles in the first half and log 2 (2T − i) pebbles in the second half (by the inductive hypothesis), as required.
It is easy to see that in each of the above four cases, the number of moves does not exceed the number of pebbles (because for every pebble moving at two steps per clock tick, there exists a pebble that is standing still-namely, its most recent clone).
Security. It is, of course, crucial to ensure that the above changes to the update algorithm do not compromise the security of our scheme. It suffices to prove that every secret stored following the clock tick i can be derived in polynomial time from t i+1 . In other words, it suffices to prove that, following the clock tick i, no pebble's position P satisfies i ∈ P . This can be easily done by induction, as long as each pebble moves towards its goal by removing the smallest possible element from its position P (the inductive step is proved as follows: if 2T is the total number of time periods, then the single pebble responsible for the second half of the singletons will have removed {1, . . . , T /2} from its position following the clock tick 1, and will have removed {1, . . . , T } following the clock tick T /2 + 1).
A Details of the Proof of Theorem 1
First, we assume that if F outputs (z, σ, j, e) as a forgery, then the hashing oracle has been queried on (j, e, y, M ), where y = z e v σ mod n (any adversary can be modified to do that; this may raise the number of hash queries to q hash + 1.)
We will also assume that F performs the necessary bookkeeping and does not ask the same hash query twice.
6 Note that F may ask the same signature query twice, because the answers will most likely be different.
Recall that A's job, given α and n, is to find (with F 's help) β and r > 1 such that β r ≡ α (mod n). First, A has to guess the time period for which F will output the forgery: it randomly selects j, 1 < j ≤ T (sometimes A may also succeed if the forgery is for a time period i < j, but this not necessary for our argument). A then generates e 1 , . . . , e T just like the real signer, sets t j+1 = α and computes v as v = 1/t fj+1 j+1 mod n, where, as above, f j+1 = e j+1 · . . . · e T . A then comes up with a random tape for F , remembers it, and runs F on that tape and the input public key (n, v, T ). If F breaks in at time period b, then A can provide F with the secret key as long as b > j: knowing t j+1 will allow A to compute s b and t b+1 . If b ≤ j, then A aborts (because, in particular, F 's forgery cannot be for time period j in that case).
To answer F 's signature and hash queries, A maintains two tables: a signature query table and a hash query table.
Signature queries can be answered almost at random, because A controls the hash oracle. In order to answer a signature query number s on a message M s during time period j s , A selects a random z s ∈ Z * n and σ s ∈ {0, 1} l , computes y s = z s ej s v σs , and checks its signature query table to see if a signature query on M s during time period j s has already been asked and if y s used in answering it. If so, A changes z s and σ s to the z and σ that were used in answering that query. Then A adds the entry (s, j s , e js , y s , σ s , z s , M s ) to its signature query table and outputs (z s , σ s , j s , e js ).
Hash queries are also answered at random. To answer the t-th hash query (j t , e t , y t , M t ), A first checks its signature query table to see if there is an entry (s, j s , e js , y s , σ s , z s , M s ) such that (j s , e js , y s , M s ) = (j t , e t , y t , M t ). If so, it just outputs σ s . Otherwise, it picks a random σ t ∈ {0, 1} l , records in its hash query table the tuple (t, y t , M t , j t , e t , σ t ) and outputs σ t .
Assume now the break-in query occurs during time period b > j, and the valid forgery (z, σ, i, e) is output for a time period i ≤ j (if not, or if no valid forgery is output, A fails). Let y = z e v σ . Because we modified F to first ask a hash query on (i, e, y, M ), we have that, for some h, (h, y, M, i, e, σ) = (h, y h , M h , j h , e h , σ h ) in the hash query table (it can't come from the signature query table, because F is not allowed to forge a signature on a message for which it asked a signature query). A finds such an h in its table and remembers it.
A now resets F with the same random tape as the first time, and runs it again, giving the exact same answers to all F 's queries before the h-th hash query (it can do so because it has all the answers recorded in the tables). Note that this means that F will be asking the same h-th hash query (i, e, y, M ) as the first time. As soon as F asks the h-th hash query, however, A stops giving the answers from the tables and comes up with new answers at random, in the
